Having thrashed my opponents on another debate, I have time to return. After our convesation, I have to admit that Thielicke has a point. Sartre and other existentialists begin with despair, unlike most secular humanists, and then try to find some way of dealing with it. And in that sense — being compared to secular humanists, they are indeed being poor in spirit.

I’m still not sure a Nazi couldn’t be equally poor in spirit: “Life is without all meaning and value. I must make my own meaning and value. I find value in torturing and murdering Jews.”

Someone who believed in objective values would have a way of disagreeing with the Nazi: “There are objective values, which tell us that we should not torture or murder anyone.”

It’s not clear to me how someone who didn’t believe in objective values could disagree with the Nazi. At most, he could only resist the Nazi.

“Then what’s the big deal about being authentic?”

I think this meta-ethical question can be asked about any system, even moral systems themselves. Moral skeptics might say something like, “Sure that’s the right thing to do, but so what?” I’m not sure this is a real question. Moral properties, and maybe authenticity ethics, are supposed to be in themselves compelling to us, for one reason or another. In any case I’m not sure I really have to answer these deeper questions on behalf of Sartre (or any form of ethics). I think they stray from the point, which was Thielicke’s possible reasons for finding the existentialist pessimistic acknowledgment of and empty-handed confrontation with nihilism more admirable than both the other non-Christian alternatives and the unthinking Christian attitude.

Does this mean that we should respect the freedom of Nazis to take away our freedom? If not, then we are not respecting their freedom. If so, then even though we may not like, or agree with Nazis, we should respect their freedom to take away our freedom.

If authenticity involves some sort of respect for the radical freedom into which every person is born, then the Nazis are being “inauthentic,” which is what Sartre seems to have thought. The thing to acknowledge and live in terms of is the ontological condition of freedom itself. There’s no moral point about individual persons here, one way or the other. Nevertheless Sartre obviously thought about morality in the context of how he thought the world was, and so moral discourse would be given in terms of this, in terms of what allows and what hinders the fundamentally free condition.

You also ask a series of moral questions, wondering how Sartre would answer them. I’m sure Sartre the person would have answers to them, perhaps directed by a moral sense, or perhaps he would just try to decide which answers were the least destructive of the free human person. In any case I don’t think this has to do with Thielicke’s admiration. (1) Unlike most secularists, Sartre acknowledges that the ‘death of God’ means a world without objective meaning. (2) Nevertheless, Sartre takes what he has and throws himself on the side of the tormented weak and hopeless, grounding his action in the philosophical rubble left in the wake of God’s death. (3) Christian positive thinking – bad.

So it could be that Sartre ultimately doesn’t have a good philosophical grounding for a normative theory of ethics. I’m not sure why this matters, especially since he seems to have tried to live an ethical life. Thielicke never said, “I admire Sartre for his ethical theorizing.”

But the Nazi may disagree on our definition of being human. He may think that being human is being Aryan. Or he may think that creating meaning means taking away the freedom of other human beings, whoever he happens not to like.

Indeed, a Nazi would have to set himself against the existentialists to continue as a Nazi (as, I think, they would and did). I’m not sure how Nazis disagreeing with Sartre is supposed to be a problem for Sartre, let alone for Thielicke’s admiration of Sartre. A Nazi might think the will of God is to kill Jewish people. This isn’t a problem for theological voluntarists. A Nazi might think killing all the Jews maximized the good. This isn’t a problem for utilitarians. A Nazi might think the virtues consist in harming others, hating others, and loving oneself to the detriment of others. This isn’t a problem for virtue theorists.

Sartre seems to begin by saying that there are no objective ethics, but ends by saying there are objective ethics.

To my knowledge Sartre never says there are no objective ethics. Even if he did, I’m not sure how this would relate to the passage.

Frankl (consciously or not) begins with the understanding that there is meaning, and that the patient must find meaning for his own life in order to become healthy.

Logotherapy is widely considered a form of existential analysis. However I think you are right in saying that Frankl would think there is objective meaning to be found, rather than created. However, he didn’t seem to require this of his patients, as the therapeutic goal was for them to find something meaningful – to them. Perhaps Frankl is inconsistent on this point. But that wouldn’t be any reason to find him less admirable; it furthermore isn’t a very worrisome objection to him (for me at least) to ask whether or not a Nazi could find meaning in killing Jews.

I’m not very comfortable disputing Kierkegaard, not having read Either/Or. However, it seems like what you’re saying involves a very loaded sense of the word “human.” If living “as human beings” is defined in a theologically friendly way, then it will certainly follow that the aesthetic life won’t seem very attractive to us. But I’m not sure where this gets us. For Sartre being human is being born a free creature into a horrifying world without God.

I can see that in general you want to equate “objective meaning” with “objective ethics.” I don’t see that these are the same, and I don’t think the ethical question is quite what is addressed in the passage from Thielicke. Almost all naturalistic ethical theories, and there sure are a lot of them, purport to be objective. But probably most atheists wouldn’t say there is “objective meaning,” since that term is quite hard to define. It’s even hard to define on theistic terms. Since God is a person, meaning wrapped up in him seems like it would still be subjective. Maybe with a capital S.

I’m afraid that I think this has strayed away from the graciousness of the Thielicke quote into the apologetics arena of discussing whether or not there can be goodness without God, and similar topics. Thielicke’s main focus is finding God’s grace out of shipwreck and despair and hopelessness, speaking to an audience whose entire world, physical and spiritual, had collapsed. But at the beginning, remember, he says existentialism is an expression of “an impossible existence,” a description you seem to agree with. As for ethics, Thielicke just says that the person of Sartre had an ethical dignity “higher” than the “painful conservatives” who are then described. Nothing about it being grounded by iron laws of logic to first principles.

Let’s take the proposition, “Authenticity involves the respect of the intrinsic freedom we are born into.” I’m not sure, but I think you mean by this, “In order to be authentic, you must respect the freedom of all other people.” One can then ask, “Is it morally imperative to be authentic?” If the answer is, “Yes,” then we seem to be admitting the existence of objective morality. If the answer is, “No,” then we can ask, “Then what’s the big deal about being authentic?”

We have further problems. Let’s suppose that we agree, for whatever reason, that we should respect the freedom of all other people. Does this mean that we should respect the freedom of Nazis to take away our freedom? If not, then we are not respecting their freedom. If so, then even though we may not like, or agree with Nazis, we should respect their freedom to take away our freedom.

We can amend our proposition, and say, “In order to be authentic, we must respect the freedom of all other people, unless they are trying to take away the freedom of others. In such cases, we must resist their freedom.”

So now we seem to be on the verge of developing a very complex morality, none of which is “objective.” For other questions come into being. What if we have mulit-national corporations that are fixing prices in order to boost profits? Should we allow prostitution? Should we allow the selling and using of harmful drugs? Should we allow abortions? Should we allow television commercials that appeal to sex in order to sell things? The list goes on and on.

I wrote: ” Perhaps I don’t understand Nihilism. I thought it was the view that there was no meaning, period. Doing the “best we can” means nothing. Making “our own meaning” would be an illusion. Preaching that we can make our own meanng would be a lie.”

Josh responded: “Nihilism would be something like the view (or, let’s say, the problem, if the underlying view is accurate) that our world is without objective purpose, that there is in fact no loving father to welcome us home or to guide our lives, that no good story describes the human predicament, and so on. An existentialist acknowledges the bulk of this (already becoming more honest and poor in spirit in Thielicke’s sense than competing secular philosophies) and says that because of this lack of meaning, lack of a narrative, we are left to create our own narratives and meanings. So the meaning becomes smaller, subjective, highly fragile. In this sense it is an empty-handed philosophy, a philosophy that says, “This isn’t much, but it’s all I have.””

Let’s take your phrase, “…because of this lack of meaning…we are left to create our own narratives and meanings.”

How is it that the Nazi’s meaning is any less meaningful for him than our meaning is for us? “Because the definition of being human is freedom,” you retort. “And the Nazi doesn’t respect this.” But the Nazi may disagree on our definition of being human. He may think that being human is being Aryan. Or he may think that creating meaning means taking away the freedom of other human beings, whoever he happens not to like. I agree that Sartre’s existentialism is a very empty-handed philosophy.

I said: “… it seems that Sartre said, “There’s not God, so there’s no meaning, but here’s how you can have meaning.” I don’t find this admirable.”

“Will you resist finding any secular philosophy admirable?”

I will resist what I find to be inconsistent. Sartre seems to begin by saying that there are no objective ethics, but ends by saying there are objective ethics. I find that inconsistent, and so I will resist it. Not resisting it seems very uninteresting to me.

“ If that is so, continued discussion might not be very interesting (to me at least). Obviously there is an acknowledgment in existentialism that there is no meaning or purpose that exists before or outside of us. Hence the existentialist catchphrase, “existence precedes essence.” You might want to say, “subjective or created meaning isn’t meaning at all,” but that just sounds to me like defining the problem away. Plenty of people find non-objective meaning in their lives, not prepackaged and handed down to them from above.”

But Sartre is prepackaging and handing down his standard of ethics to us!

“Viktor Frankl advocates for something very much like this, in his book Man’s Search for Meaning, which is probably why his school of psychotherapy is associated with existentialism.”

No, what Frankl does is show that psychological health is largely dependant upon finding meaning. If Frankl said to his patients, “There is no real meaning, but if you want to get better, than make up some meaning of your own,” then I doubt he would have healed very many people. Frankl (consciously or not) begins with the understanding that there is meaning, and that the patient must find meaning for his own life in order to become healthy.

I said, “Yeah, that sounds like what Thielicke is trying to say in this passage. But then shouldn’t he praise the Nazis for their being “poor in spirit”?”

You replied, “No.”

Why not?

I wrote: “This is just the beginnng of Kierkegaard’s exploration of the human condition, which ultimately comes to faith in God Incarnate as the only solution to our problem.”

You replied, “Kierkegaard’s solution obviously isn’t “the only solution.””

I don’t think you understand Kierkegaard. Unlike Sartre, he begins with the view that we can live as if there is no objective meaning, in which case, the aesthetic life (living for pleasure, basically) is the rational choice. After reading Part I of Either/Or, which presents people living this way, I think most people will come away thinking there is something sub-human about this. I think that’s what Kierkegaard was trying to show. In that case, if they want to live as human beings, they will choose the alternative, that there is obective meaning, and objective ethics. For Kierkegaard, this would include belief in God.

We can argue, as most atheists do, that there can be objective meaning and ethics, without God. So perhaps Kierkegaard’s alternative isn’t the only one. But at least there is an admission that there objective meaning and ethics. Something Sartre apparently didn’t want to admit.

“ It’s just the only solution resulting in what you or I take to be the right answer, perhaps. It’s the only happy solution, maybe. But existentialism does not pretend to be a cheery philosophy like the cheery philosophies of faith in God Incarnate, secular humanism, or hedonism. Existentialism is very pessimistic and sad, another reason to think it poor in spirit. I suspect Sartre very much wanted there to be a God – especially a god who didn’t seem to leave humans alone in their resistance to those all too authentic Nazis.‘

I very much doubt that Sartre wanted there to be a God. From the little I know about him, I think he was an intellectual drama queen.

The authentic Nazi issue seems like a non-starter to me, for reasons like the quote given to you. If Sartre thinks authenticity involves the respect of the intrinsic freedom we are born into, then that disqualifies the Nazi view. Sure, the Nazi could “disagree.” But the Nazi could “disagree” with a theistic moralist just as easily, and say he was commanded by God to commit genocide.

Perhaps I don’t understand Nihilism. I thought it was the view that there was no meaning, period. Doing the “best we can” means nothing. Making “our own meaning” would be an illusion. Preaching that we can make our own meanng would be a lie.

Nihilism would be something like the view (or, let’s say, the problem, if the underlying view is accurate) that our world is without objective purpose, that there is in fact no loving father to welcome us home or to guide our lives, that no good story describes the human predicament, and so on. An existentialist acknowledges the bulk of this (already becoming more honest and poor in spirit in Thielicke’s sense than competing secular philosophies) and says that because of this lack of meaning, lack of a narrative, we are left to create our own narratives and meanings. So the meaning becomes smaller, subjective, highly fragile. In this sense it is an empty-handed philosophy, a philosophy that says, “This isn’t much, but it’s all I have.”

it seems that Sartre said, “There’s not God, so there’s no meaning, but here’s how you can have meaning.” I don’t find this admirable.

Will you resist finding any secular philosophy admirable? If that is so, continued discussion might not be very interesting (to me at least). Obviously there is an acknowledgment in existentialism that there is no meaning or purpose that exists before or outside of us. Hence the existentialist catchphrase, “existence precedes essence.” You might want to say, “subjective or created meaning isn’t meaning at all,” but that just sounds to me like defining the problem away. Plenty of people find non-objective meaning in their lives, not prepackaged and handed down to them from above. Viktor Frankl advocates for something very much like this, in his book Man’s Search for Meaning, which is probably why his school of psychotherapy is associated with existentialism.

Yeah, that sounds like what Thielicke is trying to say in this passage. But then shouldn’t he praise the Nazis for their being “poor in spirit”?

No.

This is just the beginnng of Kierkegaard’s exploration of the human condition, which ultimately comes to faith in God Incarnate as the only solution to our problem.

Kierkegaard’s solution obviously isn’t “the only solution.” It’s just the only solution resulting in what you or I take to be the right answer, perhaps. It’s the only happy solution, maybe. But existentialism does not pretend to be a cheery philosophy like the cheery philosophies of faith in God Incarnate, secular humanism, or hedonism. Existentialism is very pessimistic and sad, another reason to think it poor in spirit. I suspect Sartre very much wanted there to be a God – especially a god who didn’t seem to leave humans alone in their resistance to those all too authentic Nazis.