Helmut Thielicke on nihilism and the grace of God
One of my favorite books is Helmut Thielicke’s Nihilism: Its Origin and Nature. At the end of the book Thielicke discusses the honesty of Sartre’s existentialist confrontation of nihilism. Here’s an excerpt.
This philosophy has the dignity of being an honest expression of an impossible existence. And its author [Sartre] merits the respect that must be paid to one who has vicariously taken upon himself for many the fate of nihilistic involvement and been courageous enough to slough off the bourgeois veneer.
Here – as well as in the case of many expressions of modern art, abstract, non-objective, and surrealist art – we must conclude that there is a “loss of the center.” But we may do this only if we say at the same time that its author represents a higher ethical dignity than do the painful conservatives who will not dare to make such an honest confession, but rather, by trying to restore the classical, go on telling lies with the help of an illegitimate, stolen beauty. Even the confession that one is confronted with Nothingness has about it the luster of honesty which will not remain without blessing; for it has to do with that willingness to be stripped of illusions and be defeated that must be suffered wherever one takes life and death really seriously. And perhaps Jesus Christ would include this philosophy of the empty hands and this art of the lost center in that mysteriously honored domain which he described as spiritual poverty and emptiness before God, but which nevertheless was full of promise: Blessed are these – far more blessed in any case than the rich fools and other “possessors,” than the real or seeming “beati possidenti.”
We may venture to express it this way: No man will ever come to the truth and thus to a trustworthy bridge over the abyss of Nothingness who has not faced doubt, despair, and shipwreck. This is the virtue of the great Descartes, to whose spirit everyone who is intellectually alive and responsible should devote a lock of hair. He knew that one comes to the truth only through doubt. And we would be doing him an injustice if we were to assume that he used doubt merely as a dodge, as a heuristic principle, as it were, knowing all the time that in the next moment a brilliant, self-evident proof of God would emerge.
He who really doubts never employs a trick of method; rather he exposes himself to despair and shipwreck. He who wants to die “in order” to become has not really died at all. In such cases theology speaks of temptation (Anfechtung). Not until a man is in the fiery furnace of utter bewilderment and despair does he see what is really genuine. This is what Luther meant when he said that “tentatio facit theologum” (temptation makes the theologian). He who simply cultivates and preserves the sheltered garden of his childhood faith and the ideals of Western Civilization, always fending off the destructive onslaughts of doubt, can never really experience the miracle of grace. For at best he puts his faith in his own faith, perhaps only in the faith of former generations. He never believes, however, in the God who seeks him with his grace.
He who knows what faith is must also have stood beneath the baleful eye of that demonic power against which we fling our faith. Faith is a struggle or it is nothing.
He who, for fear of falling victim to nihilistic self-destruction, hysterically seeks to hold on to what was once holy to him, to the higher goods of humanity that mean something to him, falls victim to hysteria and loses his intellectual inegrity. He who wants to believe must go through death.
But let him beware of a teleology of dying, of dying as a trick. Let him not dare to play with nihilism, as some youngsters perhaps do. The poor in spirit is not a snob.
Anybody who has ever been snatched away from nihilism knows that this does not happen by way of a harmless process of growth and becoming; he knows that he has been laid hold of by a higher hand and drawn across the saving border (Helmut Thielicke, Nihilism, 175-177).
Thank you for sharing this.
That last bit was particularly relevant to my own life. Recently I tried looking for this book but have been unsuccessful in finding it (except for $100 copies on amazon).
Here’s a link:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/offer-listing/B0007DLQWQ/ref=ed_oe_h_olp
This is great! Why the picture of Dick Cheney though?
Thanks a lot. I wonder why I was only seeing $100 used copies when I searched. Oh well.
Perhaps you are very pessimistic!
I’m afraid I’m not sure I understand what Thielecke is trying to say here.
So, does anybody else understand what Thielicke is trying to say?
Julian,
Are you saying you don’t think it’s clear at all? Or you find certain parts clear and not others? Or do you think you indeed have an idea of what Thielicke is saying but find it too objectionable to attribute to him?
Joshua: “Are you saying you don’t think it’s clear at all? Or you find certain parts clear and not others? Or do you think you indeed have an idea of what Thielicke is saying but find it too objectionable to attribute to him?”
Yes.
Well in that case I’ll just give some random thoughts. I think Thielicke addresses many topics in this passage (it is at the end of a complicated book, after all). I’ll list some of the points that I like:
(1) Nihilism is an accurate description of what humans face in a word without God, and existentialism (as represented by Sartre) is an honest confrontation and acknowledgment of this reality. Indeed, it may be one form of being “poor in spirit.”
(2) Only through great struggle, cognitive or otherwise, do we fully perceive and experience the saving, sustaining, and meaning-constituting grace of God.
(3) Those who simply engage in apologetical projects without any struggle or investigation, merely sheltering the faith of their childhood, are not acting admirably or usefully.
(4) Those who see a world without God but do not confront it with the honesty of a philosophy like existentialism are telling lies (to themselves or others, Thielicke doesn’t say).
There’s some things. I think there’s a lot more in the passage, but I don’t know what you have in mind. Maybe I’m being led into a trap!
EDIT: I should say that before you attack Thielicke, note that he is holding a cigar, which as we both know adds to the veracity of philosophical positions.
Joshua: “(1) Nihilism is an accurate description of what humans face in a word without God,….
I’ll buy that.
“…and existentialism (as represented by Sartre) is an honest confrontation and acknowledgment of this reality. Indeed, it may be one form of being “poor in spirit.””
Not having read any of Sartre, I’m not sure what existentialim is, or at least, what Sartre’s version of existentialism is. I assumed that existentialism was an attempt to derive meaning from an individual’s choices. It didn’t matter what they chose, just as long as they chose for no other reason than choosing. And that was what gave their choice, and their life, meaning. But perhaps I misunderstand existentialism. But assuming that I don’t misunderstand it, then Sartre is trying to offer us something other than Nihilism, which means that he isn’t really being “poor in spirit,” and shouldn’t be paid any respect. Nor is he being especially “courageous” or vicariously taking upon himself nihilistic involvement for the many. He’s merely trying to cheat Nihilism. But perhaps I misunderstand existentialism.
“(2) Only through great struggle, cognitive or otherwise, do we fully perceive and experience the saving, sustaining, and meaning-constituting grace of God.”
I guess most of my struggles have been against the saving and sustaining grace of God. It’s only by finally giving up fighting against God that I come to experience His grace. Somehow I don’t think that’s what Thielicke means.
“(3) Those who simply engage in apologetical projects without any struggle or investigation, merely sheltering the faith of their childhood, are not acting admirably or usefully.”
I’ll buy that.
“(4) Those who see a world without God but do not confront it with the honesty of a philosophy like existentialism are telling lies (to themselves or others, Thielicke doesn’t say).”
So let’s hope I misunderstand existentialism, or it’s just more lie-telling.
“There’s some things.I think there’s a lot more in the passage, but I don’t know what you have in mind. Maybe I’m being led into a trap!”
I hope I’m not that dishonest. Since someone I greatly admired, greatly admired Thielicke, I’m struggling to read this passage in a sympathetic light. Thanks for trying to help.
This sounds a lot like me. What I take the point to be here is that Sartre acknowledged the “Nothingness,” and held that we throw ourselves into it and do the best we can. Indeed we have to make our own meaning through our choices – but because that’s all we can do, not because there’s anything especially wonderful about that predicament. Thielicke furthermore seems to admire Sartre for his “nihilistic involvement.” I’m not sure what he means exactly, but I assume he is referring to the fact that Sartre nevertheless involved himself in moral issues of his day, opposing Nazism, Antisemitism, and so on. I think people like this might be “poor in spirit” in the (or a) relevant sense.
I think it’s safe to say that we struggle in our lives against things like doubt, or human wickedness, or a harsh world. Obviously that’s a different kind of struggle than what you mean. After all, Thielicke is speaking from a context where not only the physical world, but the thought world, had collapsed. Surely an honest confrontation of those realities would cause struggle, not necessarily against God but against a rough world, apparent meaninglessness, and so on.
Insofar as existentialism agrees that the word is intrinsically meaningless we could still say it’s a lie, but of a different sort. Thielicke seems to think it honest in exactly one way: simply that it acknowledges the meaninglessness of a world without God.
I would say leading questions are somewhere between honesty and dishonesty. But yours doesn’t seem like a leading question.
I should add that I read Thielicke’s book several years ago, and that I first came across this passage then. I have forgotten much of the content of the book, but my feeling of favor remains. So it could be that my understanding of this passage has deteriorated over time!
Joshua: “What I take the point to be here is that Sartre acknowledged the “Nothingness,” and held that we throw ourselves into it and do the best we can. Indeed we have to make our own meaning through our choices – but because that’s all we can do, not because there’s anything especially wonderful about that predicament.”
Perhaps I don’t understand Nihilism. I thought it was the view that there was no meaning, period. Doing the “best we can” means nothing. Making “our own meaning” would be an illusion. Preaching that we can make our own meanng would be a lie. What Sartre should have done was say, “I must admit that certain acts or beliefs or postures are meaningful. Therefore Nihilism is false. Given the conditional: ‘If God does not exist, then Nihilism is true,’ and given that Nihilism is false, God exists. I must admit that my intellectual reasons for denying God’s existence are inadequate.”
That would have been an honest approach to the problem. Instead, it seems that Sartre said,”There’s not God, so there’s no meaning, but here’s how you can have meaning.” I don’t find this admirable.
“Thielicke furthermore seems to admire Sartre for his “nihilistic involvement.” I’m not sure what he means exactly, but I assume he is referring to the fact that Sartre nevertheless involved himself in moral issues of his day, opposing Nazism, Antisemitism, and so on. I think people like this might be “poor in spirit” in the (or a) relevant sense.”
Sartre’s actions denied his intellectual claim to Nihilism. We can praise him for acting as if life had meaning, even though he claimed that it didn’t. Maybe this is being poor in spirit. I would call it confused thinking.
Julian,
Nihilism, in this context, is the position that nothing has intrinsic meaning. The existential response is that we can endeavor to make things meaningful to ourselves, and that this is the best we can do in the face of the truth of nihilism.
Consider a marriage. The nihilist will say that there is nothing intrinsically meaningful about the marriage or the people involved. The existentialist will agree, but point out that a person’s spouse is nevertheless meaningful to him or her. One’s spouse holds meaning and purpose in his or her own life. This is different than saying that there is intrinsic meaning in one’s spouse, however.
Thielicke would argue that the existence of the Christian God gives us true intrinsic meaning, but without God, then the existentialist position is the best that we can do in the face of nihilism.
This is how I understand these issues, at least. Someone can correct me if I am way off the mark!
Ben: “Nihilism, in this context, is the position that nothing has intrinsic meaning. The existential response is that we can endeavor to make things meaningful to ourselves, and that this is the best we can do in the face of the truth of nihilism.”
Then according to Sartre, since he believed Nihilism to be true, his resistance to Nazism had no more real value than the Nazis’ resistance to Sartre. They were just as “authentic” (I think that’s a common term in existentialism) as he was. Do you think Sartre really believed this?
“Thielicke would argue that the existence of the Christian God gives us true intrinsic meaning, but without God, then the existentialist position is the best that we can do in the face of nihilism.”
Yeah, that sounds like what Thielicke is trying to say in this passage. But then shouldn’t he praise the Nazis for their being “poor in spirit”?
“This is how I understand these issues, at least. Someone can correct me if I am way off the mark!”
We need an existentialist. They’re just like the police. You can never find one when you need one.
Well, okay, I guess Thielicke could respond and say, “But Sartre was a Nihilist, trying to make meaning. The Nazis thought they already had meaning. So Sartre was poor in spirit. The Nazis were not.”
But then I would retort to Thielicke, “Imagine an Nihilist Nazi, then. Would you say that he was poor in spirit?”
I’m not an existentialist, but I can copy and paste.
From the SEP:
The basis of Sartrean freedom is ontological: we are free because we are not a self (an in-itself) but a presence-to-self (the transcendence or “nihilation” of our self). This implies that we are “other” to our selves, that whatever we are or whatever others may ascribe to us, we are “in the manner of not being it,” that is, in the manner of being able to assume a perspective in its regard. This inner distance reflects not only the nonself-identity of the for-itself and the ekstatic temporality that it generates but forms the site of what Sartre calls “freedom as the definition of man.” To that freedom corresponds a coextensive responsibility. We are responsible for our “world” as the horizon of meaning in which we operate and thus for everything in it insofar as their meaning and value are assigned by virtue of our life-orienting fundamental “choice.”
…Sartre sometimes talks as if any choice could be authentic so long as it is lived with a clear awareness of its contingency and responsibility. But his considered opinion excludes choices that oppress or consciously exploit others. In other words, authenticity is not entirely style; there is a general content and that content is freedom. Thus the “authentic Nazi” is explicitly disqualified as being oxymoronic. Sartre’s thesis is that freedom is the implicit object of any choice…
–I hope someone else is amused that I was forced to read Sartre.
“…Sartre sometimes talks as if any choice could be authentic so long as it is lived with a clear awareness of its contingency and responsibility. But his considered opinion excludes choices that oppress or consciously exploit others. In other words, authenticity is not entirely style; there is a general content and that content is freedom. Thus the “authentic Nazi” is explicitly disqualified as being oxymoronic. Sartre’s thesis is that freedom is the implicit object of any choice…”
I think that if we pressed Sartre he would have to admit that there could be an “authentic Nazi.” The Nazi could claim that he made his choice completely aware of its contingency and responsibility. The Nazi could either disagree with Sartre’s opinion that choices should exclude oppression or exploitation. Or he could claim that the people he chose to oppress or exploit deserved it, or that they weren’t really people. I’m not sure how Sartre could refute the Nazi.
“–I hope someone else is amused that I was forced to read Sartre.”
By the way, I haven’t read any official existentialists, but I have read Kierkegaard, who is sometimes considered the father of existentialism. I suggest his Either/Or. Instead of preaching to people on how they should live, he presents two options: The aesthetic and the ethical life. One can choose the aesthetic life, which results in some pleasure and happiness, and also some misery and emptiness. By the end of the aesthetic section, one comes away thinking that there is something sub-human about the aesthetic life. So he then examines the ethical life, which results in commitments to personal relationships, to living in terms of what is good, and in belief in God.
This is just the beginnng of Kierkegaard’s exploration of the human condition, which ultimately comes to faith in God Incarnate as the only solution to our problem.
I think existentialists, by and large, rejected this, and end up giving us inconsistent philosophies in its place.
Julian,
The authentic Nazi issue seems like a non-starter to me, for reasons like the quote given to you. If Sartre thinks authenticity involves the respect of the intrinsic freedom we are born into, then that disqualifies the Nazi view. Sure, the Nazi could “disagree.” But the Nazi could “disagree” with a theistic moralist just as easily, and say he was commanded by God to commit genocide.
Nihilism would be something like the view (or, let’s say, the problem, if the underlying view is accurate) that our world is without objective purpose, that there is in fact no loving father to welcome us home or to guide our lives, that no good story describes the human predicament, and so on. An existentialist acknowledges the bulk of this (already becoming more honest and poor in spirit in Thielicke’s sense than competing secular philosophies) and says that because of this lack of meaning, lack of a narrative, we are left to create our own narratives and meanings. So the meaning becomes smaller, subjective, highly fragile. In this sense it is an empty-handed philosophy, a philosophy that says, “This isn’t much, but it’s all I have.”
Will you resist finding any secular philosophy admirable? If that is so, continued discussion might not be very interesting (to me at least). Obviously there is an acknowledgment in existentialism that there is no meaning or purpose that exists before or outside of us. Hence the existentialist catchphrase, “existence precedes essence.” You might want to say, “subjective or created meaning isn’t meaning at all,” but that just sounds to me like defining the problem away. Plenty of people find non-objective meaning in their lives, not prepackaged and handed down to them from above. Viktor Frankl advocates for something very much like this, in his book Man’s Search for Meaning, which is probably why his school of psychotherapy is associated with existentialism.
No.
Kierkegaard’s solution obviously isn’t “the only solution.” It’s just the only solution resulting in what you or I take to be the right answer, perhaps. It’s the only happy solution, maybe. But existentialism does not pretend to be a cheery philosophy like the cheery philosophies of faith in God Incarnate, secular humanism, or hedonism. Existentialism is very pessimistic and sad, another reason to think it poor in spirit. I suspect Sartre very much wanted there to be a God – especially a god who didn’t seem to leave humans alone in their resistance to those all too authentic Nazis.
Joshua: “The authentic Nazi issue seems like a non-starter to me, for reasons like the quote given to you. If Sartre thinks authenticity involves the respect of the intrinsic freedom we are born into, then that disqualifies the Nazi view. Sure, the Nazi could “disagree.” But the Nazi could “disagree” with a theistic moralist just as easily, and say he was commanded by God to commit genocide.”
Let’s take the proposition, “Authenticity involves the respect of the intrinsic freedom we are born into.” I’m not sure, but I think you mean by this, “In order to be authentic, you must respect the freedom of all other people.” One can then ask, “Is it morally imperative to be authentic?” If the answer is, “Yes,” then we seem to be admitting the existence of objective morality. If the answer is, “No,” then we can ask, “Then what’s the big deal about being authentic?”
We have further problems. Let’s suppose that we agree, for whatever reason, that we should respect the freedom of all other people. Does this mean that we should respect the freedom of Nazis to take away our freedom? If not, then we are not respecting their freedom. If so, then even though we may not like, or agree with Nazis, we should respect their freedom to take away our freedom.
We can amend our proposition, and say, “In order to be authentic, we must respect the freedom of all other people, unless they are trying to take away the freedom of others. In such cases, we must resist their freedom.”
So now we seem to be on the verge of developing a very complex morality, none of which is “objective.” For other questions come into being. What if we have mulit-national corporations that are fixing prices in order to boost profits? Should we allow prostitution? Should we allow the selling and using of harmful drugs? Should we allow abortions? Should we allow television commercials that appeal to sex in order to sell things? The list goes on and on.
I wrote: ” Perhaps I don’t understand Nihilism. I thought it was the view that there was no meaning, period. Doing the “best we can” means nothing. Making “our own meaning” would be an illusion. Preaching that we can make our own meanng would be a lie.”
Josh responded: “Nihilism would be something like the view (or, let’s say, the problem, if the underlying view is accurate) that our world is without objective purpose, that there is in fact no loving father to welcome us home or to guide our lives, that no good story describes the human predicament, and so on. An existentialist acknowledges the bulk of this (already becoming more honest and poor in spirit in Thielicke’s sense than competing secular philosophies) and says that because of this lack of meaning, lack of a narrative, we are left to create our own narratives and meanings. So the meaning becomes smaller, subjective, highly fragile. In this sense it is an empty-handed philosophy, a philosophy that says, “This isn’t much, but it’s all I have.””
Let’s take your phrase, “…because of this lack of meaning…we are left to create our own narratives and meanings.”
How is it that the Nazi’s meaning is any less meaningful for him than our meaning is for us? “Because the definition of being human is freedom,” you retort. “And the Nazi doesn’t respect this.” But the Nazi may disagree on our definition of being human. He may think that being human is being Aryan. Or he may think that creating meaning means taking away the freedom of other human beings, whoever he happens not to like. I agree that Sartre’s existentialism is a very empty-handed philosophy.
I said: “… it seems that Sartre said, “There’s not God, so there’s no meaning, but here’s how you can have meaning.” I don’t find this admirable.”
“Will you resist finding any secular philosophy admirable?”
I will resist what I find to be inconsistent. Sartre seems to begin by saying that there are no objective ethics, but ends by saying there are objective ethics. I find that inconsistent, and so I will resist it. Not resisting it seems very uninteresting to me.
“ If that is so, continued discussion might not be very interesting (to me at least). Obviously there is an acknowledgment in existentialism that there is no meaning or purpose that exists before or outside of us. Hence the existentialist catchphrase, “existence precedes essence.” You might want to say, “subjective or created meaning isn’t meaning at all,” but that just sounds to me like defining the problem away. Plenty of people find non-objective meaning in their lives, not prepackaged and handed down to them from above.”
But Sartre is prepackaging and handing down his standard of ethics to us!
“Viktor Frankl advocates for something very much like this, in his book Man’s Search for Meaning, which is probably why his school of psychotherapy is associated with existentialism.”
No, what Frankl does is show that psychological health is largely dependant upon finding meaning. If Frankl said to his patients, “There is no real meaning, but if you want to get better, than make up some meaning of your own,” then I doubt he would have healed very many people. Frankl (consciously or not) begins with the understanding that there is meaning, and that the patient must find meaning for his own life in order to become healthy.
I said, “Yeah, that sounds like what Thielicke is trying to say in this passage. But then shouldn’t he praise the Nazis for their being “poor in spirit”?”
You replied, “No.”
Why not?
I wrote: “This is just the beginnng of Kierkegaard’s exploration of the human condition, which ultimately comes to faith in God Incarnate as the only solution to our problem.”
You replied, “Kierkegaard’s solution obviously isn’t “the only solution.””
I don’t think you understand Kierkegaard. Unlike Sartre, he begins with the view that we can live as if there is no objective meaning, in which case, the aesthetic life (living for pleasure, basically) is the rational choice. After reading Part I of Either/Or, which presents people living this way, I think most people will come away thinking there is something sub-human about this. I think that’s what Kierkegaard was trying to show. In that case, if they want to live as human beings, they will choose the alternative, that there is obective meaning, and objective ethics. For Kierkegaard, this would include belief in God.
We can argue, as most atheists do, that there can be objective meaning and ethics, without God. So perhaps Kierkegaard’s alternative isn’t the only one. But at least there is an admission that there objective meaning and ethics. Something Sartre apparently didn’t want to admit.
“ It’s just the only solution resulting in what you or I take to be the right answer, perhaps. It’s the only happy solution, maybe. But existentialism does not pretend to be a cheery philosophy like the cheery philosophies of faith in God Incarnate, secular humanism, or hedonism. Existentialism is very pessimistic and sad, another reason to think it poor in spirit. I suspect Sartre very much wanted there to be a God – especially a god who didn’t seem to leave humans alone in their resistance to those all too authentic Nazis.‘
I very much doubt that Sartre wanted there to be a God. From the little I know about him, I think he was an intellectual drama queen.
I think this meta-ethical question can be asked about any system, even moral systems themselves. Moral skeptics might say something like, “Sure that’s the right thing to do, but so what?” I’m not sure this is a real question. Moral properties, and maybe authenticity ethics, are supposed to be in themselves compelling to us, for one reason or another. In any case I’m not sure I really have to answer these deeper questions on behalf of Sartre (or any form of ethics). I think they stray from the point, which was Thielicke’s possible reasons for finding the existentialist pessimistic acknowledgment of and empty-handed confrontation with nihilism more admirable than both the other non-Christian alternatives and the unthinking Christian attitude.
If authenticity involves some sort of respect for the radical freedom into which every person is born, then the Nazis are being “inauthentic,” which is what Sartre seems to have thought. The thing to acknowledge and live in terms of is the ontological condition of freedom itself. There’s no moral point about individual persons here, one way or the other. Nevertheless Sartre obviously thought about morality in the context of how he thought the world was, and so moral discourse would be given in terms of this, in terms of what allows and what hinders the fundamentally free condition.
You also ask a series of moral questions, wondering how Sartre would answer them. I’m sure Sartre the person would have answers to them, perhaps directed by a moral sense, or perhaps he would just try to decide which answers were the least destructive of the free human person. In any case I don’t think this has to do with Thielicke’s admiration. (1) Unlike most secularists, Sartre acknowledges that the ‘death of God’ means a world without objective meaning. (2) Nevertheless, Sartre takes what he has and throws himself on the side of the tormented weak and hopeless, grounding his action in the philosophical rubble left in the wake of God’s death. (3) Christian positive thinking – bad.
So it could be that Sartre ultimately doesn’t have a good philosophical grounding for a normative theory of ethics. I’m not sure why this matters, especially since he seems to have tried to live an ethical life. Thielicke never said, “I admire Sartre for his ethical theorizing.”
Indeed, a Nazi would have to set himself against the existentialists to continue as a Nazi (as, I think, they would and did). I’m not sure how Nazis disagreeing with Sartre is supposed to be a problem for Sartre, let alone for Thielicke’s admiration of Sartre. A Nazi might think the will of God is to kill Jewish people. This isn’t a problem for theological voluntarists. A Nazi might think killing all the Jews maximized the good. This isn’t a problem for utilitarians. A Nazi might think the virtues consist in harming others, hating others, and loving oneself to the detriment of others. This isn’t a problem for virtue theorists.
To my knowledge Sartre never says there are no objective ethics. Even if he did, I’m not sure how this would relate to the passage.
Logotherapy is widely considered a form of existential analysis. However I think you are right in saying that Frankl would think there is objective meaning to be found, rather than created. However, he didn’t seem to require this of his patients, as the therapeutic goal was for them to find something meaningful – to them. Perhaps Frankl is inconsistent on this point. But that wouldn’t be any reason to find him less admirable; it furthermore isn’t a very worrisome objection to him (for me at least) to ask whether or not a Nazi could find meaning in killing Jews.
I’m not very comfortable disputing Kierkegaard, not having read Either/Or. However, it seems like what you’re saying involves a very loaded sense of the word “human.” If living “as human beings” is defined in a theologically friendly way, then it will certainly follow that the aesthetic life won’t seem very attractive to us. But I’m not sure where this gets us. For Sartre being human is being born a free creature into a horrifying world without God.
I can see that in general you want to equate “objective meaning” with “objective ethics.” I don’t see that these are the same, and I don’t think the ethical question is quite what is addressed in the passage from Thielicke. Almost all naturalistic ethical theories, and there sure are a lot of them, purport to be objective. But probably most atheists wouldn’t say there is “objective meaning,” since that term is quite hard to define. It’s even hard to define on theistic terms. Since God is a person, meaning wrapped up in him seems like it would still be subjective. Maybe with a capital S.
I’m afraid that I think this has strayed away from the graciousness of the Thielicke quote into the apologetics arena of discussing whether or not there can be goodness without God, and similar topics. Thielicke’s main focus is finding God’s grace out of shipwreck and despair and hopelessness, speaking to an audience whose entire world, physical and spiritual, had collapsed. But at the beginning, remember, he says existentialism is an expression of “an impossible existence,” a description you seem to agree with. As for ethics, Thielicke just says that the person of Sartre had an ethical dignity “higher” than the “painful conservatives” who are then described. Nothing about it being grounded by iron laws of logic to first principles.
Hi Josh,
Having thrashed my opponents on another debate, I have time to return. After our convesation, I have to admit that Thielicke has a point. Sartre and other existentialists begin with despair, unlike most secular humanists, and then try to find some way of dealing with it. And in that sense — being compared to secular humanists, they are indeed being poor in spirit.
I’m still not sure a Nazi couldn’t be equally poor in spirit: “Life is without all meaning and value. I must make my own meaning and value. I find value in torturing and murdering Jews.”
Someone who believed in objective values would have a way of disagreeing with the Nazi: “There are objective values, which tell us that we should not torture or murder anyone.”
It’s not clear to me how someone who didn’t believe in objective values could disagree with the Nazi. At most, he could only resist the Nazi.
I should have added, we can commend Sartre for resisting the Nazis. But then we believe in objective values, and have a basis for making a determination of who to commend. How does a fellow existentialist commend Sartre over the Nazi?